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Abstract
A dynamic reasoning system (DRS) is an adaptation
of a conventional formal logical system that explicitly
portrays reasoning as a temporal activity, with each ex-
tralogical input to the system and each inference rule
application being viewed as occurring at a distinct time
step. Every DRS incorporates some well-defined logic
together with a controller that serves to guide the rea-
soning process in response to user inputs. Logics are
generic, whereas controllers are application-specific.
Every controller does, nonetheless, provide an algo-
rithm for nonmonotonic belief revision. The general no-
tion of a DRS comprises a framework within which one
can formulate the logic and algorithms for a given ap-
plication and prove that the algorithms are correct, i.e.,
that they serve to (i) derive all salient information and
(ii) preserve the consistency of the belief set. This pa-
per illustrates the idea with ordinary first-order predi-
cate calculus, suitably modified for the present purpose,
and an example. The example revisits some classic non-
monotonic reasoning puzzles (Opus the Penguin, Nixon
Diamond) and shows how these can be resolved in the
context of a DRS, using an expanded version of first-
order logic that incorporates typed predicate symbols.
All concepts are rigorously defined and effectively com-
putable, thereby providing the foundation for a future
software implementation.
1. Introduction
This paper provide a brief overview of a longer paper
that has been accepted for publication, subject to revi-
sion, as (Schwartz 2013). The full text of that paper (64
pages) may be viewed in the arXiv CoRR repository at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.5374.
The notion of a dynamic reasoning system (DRS) was in-
troduced in (Schwartz 1997) for purposes of formulating
reasoning involving a logic of ‘qualified syllogisms’. The
idea arose in an effort to devise rules for evidence combina-
tion. The logic under study included a multivalent semantics
where propositions P were assigned a probabilistic ‘likeli-
hood value’ l(P ) in the interval [0, 1], so that the likelihood
value plays the role of a surrogate truth value. The situa-
tion being modeled is where, based on some evidence, P
is assigned a likelihood value l1, and then later, based on
other evidence, is assigned a value l2, and it subsequently
is desired to combine these values based on some rule into
a resulting value l3. This type of reasoning cannot be rep-
resented in a conventional formal logical system with the
usual Tarski semantics, since such systems do not allow that
a proposition may have more than one truth value; otherwise
the semantics would not be mathematically well-defined.
Thus the idea arose to speak more explicitly about different
occurrences of the propositions P where the occurrences are
separated in time. In this manner one can construct a well-
defined semantics by mapping the different time-stamped
occurrences of P to different likelihood/truth values.
In turn, this led to viewing a ‘derivation path’ as it evolves
over time as representing the knowledge base, or belief
set, of a reasoning agent that is progressively building and
modifying its knowledge/beliefs through ongoing interac-
tion with its environment (including inputs from human
users or other agents). It also presented a framework within
which one can formulate a Doyle-like procedure for non-
monotonic ‘reason maintenance’ (Doyle 1979; Smith and
Kelleher 1988). Briefly, if the knowledge base harbors in-
consistencies due to contradictory inputs from the environ-
ment, then in time a contradiction may appear in the rea-
soning path (knowledge base, belief set), triggering a back-
tracking procedure aimed at uncovering the ‘culprit’ propo-
sitions that gave rise to the contradiction and disabling (dis-
believing) one or more of them so as to remove the incon-
sistency. Accordingly the overall reasoning process may be
characterized as being ‘nonmonotonic’.
Reasoning is nonmonotonic when the discovery and intro-
duction of new information causes one to retract previously
held assumptions or conclusions. This is to be contrasted
with classical formal logical systems, which are monotonic
in that the introduction of new information (nonlogical ax-
ioms) always increases the collection of conclusions (theo-
rems). (Schwartz 1997) contains an extensive bibliography
and survey of the works related to nonmonotonic reason-
ing as of 1997. In particular, this includes a discussion of
(i) the classic paper by McCarthy and Hayes (McCarthy and
Hayes 1969) defining the ‘frame problem’ and describing
the ‘situation calculus’, (ii) Doyle’s ‘truth maintenance sys-
tem’ (Doyle1979) and subsequent ‘reason maintenance sys-
tem’ (Smith and Kelleher 1988), (iii) McCarthy’s ‘circum-
scription’ (McCarthy 1980), (iv) Reiter’s ‘default logic’ (Re-
iter 1980), and (v) McDermott and Doyle’s ‘nonmonotonic
logic’ (McDermott and Doyle 1980). With regard to tempo-
ral aspects, there also are discussed works by Shoham and
Perlis. (Shoham 1986; 1988) explores the idea of making
time an explicit feature of the logical formalism for reason-
ing ‘about’ change, and (Shoham 1993) describes a vision
of ‘agent-oriented programming’ that is along the same lines
of the present DRS, portraying reasoning itself as a temporal
activity. In (Elgot-Drapkin 1988; Elgot-Drapkin et al. 1987;
1991; Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis 1990; Miller 1993; Perlis et
al. 1991) Perlis and his students introduce and study the no-
tion of ‘step logic’, which represents reasoning as ‘situated’
in time, and in this respect also has elements in common
with the notion of a DRS. Additionally mentioned but not
elaborated upon in (Schwartz 1997) is the so-called AGM
framework (Alchouro´n et al. 1985; Gardenfors 1988; 1992),
named after its originators. Nonmonotonic reasoning and
belief revision are related in that the former may be viewed
as a variety of the latter.
These cited works are nowadays regarded as the classic
approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision.
Since 1997 the AGM approach has risen in prominence, due
in large part to the publication (Hansson 1999), which builds
upon and substantially advances the AGM framework. AGM
defines a belief set as a collection of propositions that is
closed with respect to the classical consequence operator,
and operations of ‘contraction’, ‘expansion’ and ‘revision’
are defined on belief sets. (Hansson 1999) made the impor-
tant observation that a belief set can conveniently be repre-
sented as the consequential closure of a finite ‘belief base’,
and these same AGM operations can be defined in terms
of operations performed on belief bases. Since that publi-
cation, AGM has enjoyed a steadily growing population of
adherents. A recent publication (Ferme´ and Hansson 2011)
overviews the first 25 years of research in this area.
The DRS framework has elements in common with AGM,
but also differs in several respects. Most importantly, the
present focus is on the creation of computational algorithms
that are sufficiently articulated that they can effectively be
implemented in software and thereby lead to concrete appli-
cations. This element is still lacking in AGM, despite Hans-
son’s contribution regarding finite belief bases. The AGM
operations continue to be given only as set-theoretic abstrac-
tions and have not yet been translated into computable algo-
rithms.
Another research thread that has risen to prominence is
the logic-programming approach to nonmonotonic reason-
ing known as Answer Set Programming (or Answer Set Pro-
log, aka AnsProlog). A major work is the treatise (Baral
2003), and a more recent treatment is (Gelfond and Kahl
2014). This line of research develops an effective approach
to nonmonotonic reasoning via an adaptation of the well-
known Prolog programming language. As such, this may
be characterized as a ‘declarative’ formulation of nonmono-
toniticy, whereas the DRS approach is ‘procedural’. The ex-
tent to which the two systems address the same problems
has yet to be explored.
A way in which the present approach varies from the orig-
inal AGM approach, but happens to agree with the views ex-
pressed by (Hansson 1999, cf. pp. 15-16), is that it dispenses
with two of the original ‘rationality postulates’, namely, the
requirements that the underlying belief set be at all times
(i) consistent, and (ii) closed with respect to logical entail-
ment. The latter is sometimes called the ‘omniscience’ pos-
tulate, inasmuch as the modeled agent is thus characterized
as knowing all possible logical consequences of its beliefs.
These postulates are intuitively appealing, but they have
the drawback that they lead to infinitary systems and thus
cannot be directly implemented on a finite computer. To
wit, the logical consequences of even a fairly simple set
of beliefs will be infinite in number. Dropping these pos-
tulates does have anthropomorphic rationale, however, since
humans themselves cannot be omniscient in the sense de-
scribed, and, because of this, often harbor inconsistent be-
liefs without being aware of this. Thus it is not unreasonable
that our agent-oriented reasoning models should have these
same characteristics. Similar remarks may be found in the
cited pages of (Hansson 1999).
Other ways in which the present work differs from the
AGM approach may be noted. First, what is here taken as a
‘belief set’ is neither a belief set in the sense of AGM and
Hansson nor a Hansson-style belief base. Rather it consists
of the set of statements that have been input by an external
agent as of some time t, together with the consequences of
those statements that have been derived in accordance with
the algorithms provided in a given ‘controller’. Second, by
labeling the statements with the time step when they are en-
tered into the belief set (either by an external agent or de-
rived by means of an inference rule), one can use the la-
bels as a basis for defining the associated algorithms. Third,
whereas Ga¨rdenfors, Hansson, and virtually all others that
have worked with the AGM framework, have confined their
language to be only propositional, the present work takes the
next step to full first-order predicate logic. This is significant
inasmuch as the consistency of a finite set of propositions
with respect to the classical consequence operation can be
determined by truth-table methods, whereas the consistency
of a finite set of statements in first-order predicate logic is
undecidable (the famous result due to Go¨del). For this rea-
son the present work develops a well-defined semantics for
the chosen logic and establishes a soundness theorem, which
in turn can be used to establish consistency. Last, the present
use of a controller is itself new, and leads to a new efficacy
for applications.
The notion of a controller was not present in the previous
work (Schwartz 1997). Its introduction here thus fills an im-
portant gap in that treatment. The original conception of a
DRS provided a framework for modeling the reasoning pro-
cesses of an artificial agent to the extent that those processes
follow a well-defined logic, but it offered no mechanism for
deciding what inference rules to apply at any given time.
What was missing was a means to provide the agent with a
sense of purpose, i.e., mechanisms for pursuing goals. This
deficiency is remedied in the present treatment. The con-
troller responds to inputs from the agent’s environment, ex-
pressed as propositions in the agent’s language. Inputs are
classified as being of various ‘types’, and, depending on the
input type, a reasoning algorithm is applied. Some of these
algorithms may cause new propositions to be entered into
the belief set, which in turn may invoke other algorithms.
These algorithms thus embody the agent’s purpose and are
domain-specific, tailored to a particular application. But in
general their role is to ensure that (i) all salient propositions
are derived and entered into to the belief set, and (ii) the be-
lief set remains consistent. The latter is achieved by invoking
a Doyle-like reason maintenance algorithm whenever a con-
tradiction, i.e., a proposition of the form P ∧ ¬P , is entered
into the belief set.
This recent work accordingly represents a rethinking, re-
finement, and extension of the earlier work, aimed at (1) pro-
viding mathematical clarity to some relevant concepts that
previously were not explicitly defined, (ii) introducing the
notion of a controller and spelling out its properties, and
(iii) illustrating these ideas with a small collection of ex-
ample applications. As such the work lays the groundwork
for a software implementation of the DRS framework, this
being a domain-independent software framework into which
can be plugged domain-specific modules as required for any
given application. Note that the mathematical work delin-
eated in (Schwartz 2013) is a necessary prerequisite for the
software implementation inasmuch as this provides the for-
mal basis for an unambiguous set of requirements specifica-
tions. While the present work employs classical first-order
predicate calculus, the DRS framework can accommodate
any logic for which there exists a well-defined syntax and
semantics.
The following Section 2 provides a fully detailed defi-
nition of the notion of a DRS. Section 3 briefly describes
the version of first-order predicate logic introduced for the
present purpose and mentions a few items needed for the
ensuing discussion. Section 4 illustrates the core ideas in an
application to multiple-inheritance systems, showing a new
approach to resolving two classic puzzles of nonmontonic
reasoning, namely Opus the Penguin and Nixon Diamond.
2. Dynamic Reasoning Systems
A dynamic reasoning system (DRS) comprises a model of an
artificial agent’s reasoning processes to the extent that those
processes adhere to the principles of some well-defined
logic. Formally it is comprised of a ‘path logic’, which pro-
vides all the elements necessary for reasoning, and a ‘con-
troller’, which guides the reasoning process.
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Figure 1: Classical formal logical system.
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Figure 2: Dynamic reasoning system.
For contrast, and by way of introductory overview, the
basic structure of a classical formal logical system is por-
trayed in Figure 1 and that of a DRS in Figure 2. A classical
system is defined by providing a language consisting of a
set of propositions, selecting certain propositions to serve as
axioms, and specifying a set of inference rules saying how,
from certain premises one can derive certain conclusions.
The theorems then amount to all the propositions that can
be derived from the axioms by means of the rules. Such sys-
tems are monotonic in that adding new axioms always serves
to increase the set of theorems. Axioms are of two kinds:
logical and extralogical (or ‘proper’, or ‘nonlogical’). The
logical axioms together with the inference rules comprise
the ‘logic’. The extralogical axioms comprise information
about the application domain. A DRS begins similarly with
specifying a language consisting of a set of propositions. But
here the ‘logic’ is given in terms of a set of axioms schemas,
some inference rules as above, and some rules for instantiat-
ing the schemas. The indicated derivation path serves as the
belief set. Logical axioms may be entered into the derivation
path by applying instantiation rules. Extralogical axioms are
entered from an external source (human user, another agent,
a mechanical sensor, etc.). Thus the derivation path evolves
over time, with propositions being entered into the path ei-
ther as extralogical axioms or derived by means of infer-
ence rules in accordance with the algorithms provided in the
controller. Whenever a new proposition is entered into the
path it is marked as ‘believed’. In the event that a contra-
diction arises in the derivation path, a nonmonotonic belief
revision process is invoked which leads to certain previously
believed propositions becoming disbelieved, thereby remov-
ing the contradiction. A brief overview of these two compo-
nents of a DRS is given in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
2.1. Path Logic
A path logic consists of a language, axiom schemas, infer-
ence rules, and a derivation path, as follows.
Language: Here denoted L, this consists of all expres-
sions (or formulas) that can be generated from a given set
σ of symbols in accordance with a collection of production
rules (or an inductive definition, or some similar manner of
definition). As symbols typically are of different types (e.g.,
individual variables, constants, predicate symbols, etc.) it
is assumed that there is an unlimited supply (uncountably
many if necessary) of each type. Moreover, as is customary,
some symbols will be logical symbols (e.g., logical connec-
tives, quantifiers, and individual variables), and some will
be extralogical symbols (e.g., individual constants and pred-
icate symbols). It is assumed that L contains at least the
logical connectives for expressing negation and conjunction,
herein denoted ¬ and ∧, or a means for defining these con-
nectives in terms of the given connectives. For example, in
the following we take ¬ and→ as given and use the standard
definition of ∧ in terms of these.
Axiom Schemas: Expressed in some meta notation, these
describe the expressions of L that are to serve as logical ax-
ioms.
Inference Rules: These must include one or more rules
that enable instantiation of the axiom schemas. All other in-
ference rules will be of the usual kind, i.e., stating that, from
expressions having certain forms (premise expressions), one
may infer an expression of some other form (a conclusion
expression). Of the latter, two kinds are allowed: logical
rules, which are considered to be part of the underlying
logic, and extralogical rules, which are associated with the
intended application. Note that logical axioms are expres-
sions that are derived by applying the axiom schema in-
stantiation rules. Inference rules may be viewed formally as
mappings from L into itself.
The rule set may include derived rules that simplify de-
ductions by encapsulating frequently used argument pat-
terns. Rules derived using only logical axioms and logical
rules will also be logical rules, and derived rules whose
derivations employ extralogical rules will be additional ex-
tralogical rules.
Derivation Paths: These consist of a sequences of pairs
(L0, B0), (L1, B1), . . ., where Lt is the sublanguage of L
that is in use at time t, and Bt is the belief set in effect at
time t. Such a sequence is generated as follows. Since lan-
guages are determined by the symbols they employ, it is use-
ful to speak more directly in terms of the set σt comprising
the symbols that are in use at time t and then let Lt be the
sublanguage of L that is based on the symbols in σt. With
this in mind, let σ0 be the logical symbols of L, so that L0 is
the minimal language employing only logical symbols, and
let B0 = ∅. Then, given (Lt, Bt), the pair (Lt+1, Bt+1) is
formed in one of the following ways:
1. σt+1 = σt (so that Lt+1 = Lt) andBt+1 is obtained from
Bt by adding an expression that is derived by application
of an inference rule that instantiates an axiom schema,
2. σt+1 = σt andBt+1 is obtained fromBt by adding an ex-
pression that is derived from expressions appearing earlier
in the path by application of an inference rule of the kind
that infers a conclusion from some premises,
3. σt+1 = σt and an expression employing these symbols is
added to Bt to form Bt+1,
4. some new extralogical symbols are added to σt to form
σt+1, and an expression employing the new symbols is
added to Bt to form Bt+1,
5. σt+1 = σt and Bt+1 is obtained from Bt by applying a
belief revision algorithm as described in the following.
Expressions entered into the belief set in accordance with
either (3) or (4) will be extralogical axioms. A DRS can gen-
erate any number of different derivation paths, depending on
the extralogical axioms that are input and the inference rules
that are applied.
Whenever an expression is entered into the belief set it is
assigned a label comprised of:
1. A time stamp, this being the value of the subscript t+1 on
the set Bt+1 formed by entering the expression into the
belief set in accordance with any of the above items (1)
through (4). The time stamp serves as an index indicating
the expression’s position in the belief set.
2. A from-list, indicating how the expression came to be en-
tered into the belief set. In case the expression is entered
in accordance with the above item (1), i.e., using a schema
instantiation rule, this list consists of the name (or other
identifier) of the schema and the name (or other identi-
fier) of the inference rule if the system has more than one
such rule. In case the expression is entered in accordance
with above item (2), the list consists of the indexes (time
stamps) of the premise expressions and the name (or other
identifier) of the inference rule. In case the expression is
entered in accordance with either of items (3) or (4), i.e.,
is a extralogical axiom, the list will consist of some code
indicating this (e.g., es standing for ‘external source’) pos-
sibly together with some identifier or other information
regarding the source.
3. A to-list, being a list of indexes of all expressions that
have been entered into the belief set as a result of rule
applications involving the given expression as a premise.
Thus to-lists may be updated at any future time.
4. A status indicator having the value bel or disbel according
as the proposition asserted by the expression currently is
believed or disbelieved. The primary significance of this
status is that only expressions that are believed can serve
as premises in inference rule applications. Whenever an
expression is first entered into the belief set, it is assigned
status bel. This value may then be changed during be-
lief revision at a later time. When an expression’s status
is changed from bel to disbel it is said to have been re-
tracted.
5. An epistemic entrenchment factor, this being a numeri-
cal value indicating the strength with which the propo-
sition asserted by the expression is held. This terminol-
ogy is adopted in recognition of the work by Ga¨rdenfors,
who initiated this concept (Gardenfors 1988; 1992), and
is used here for essentially the same purpose, namely, to
assist when making decisions regarding belief retractions.
Depending on the application, however, this value might
alternatively be interpreted as a degree of belief, as a cer-
tainty factor, as a degree of importance, or some other
type of value to be used for this purpose. Logical axioms
always receive the highest possible epistemic entrench-
ment value, whatever scale or range may be employed.
6. A knowledge category specification, having one of the
values a priori, a posteriori, analytic, and synthetic. These
terms are employed in recognition of the philosophical
tradition initiated by Immanuel Kant (Kant 1935). Logi-
cal axioms are designated as a priori; extralogical axioms
are designated as a posteriori; expressions whose deriva-
tions employ only logical axioms and logical inference
rules are designated as analytic; and expressions whose
derivations employ any extralogical axioms or extralogi-
cal rules are designated as synthetic.
Thus when an expression P is entered into the belief set,
it is more exactly entered as an expression-label pair (P, λ),
where λ is the label. A DRS’s language, axiom schemas,
and inference rules comprise a logic in the usual sense. It is
required that this logic be consistent, i.e., for no expression
P is it possible to derive both P and ¬P . The belief set may
become inconsistent, nonetheless, through the introduction
of contradictory extralogical axioms.
In what follows, only expressions representing a posteri-
ori and synthetic knowledge may be retracted; expressions
of a priori knowledge are taken as being held unequivocally.
Thus the term ‘a priori knowledge’ is taken as synonymous
with ‘belief held unequivocally’, and ‘a posteriori knowl-
edge’ is interpreted as ‘belief possibly held only tentatively’
(some a posteriori beliefs may be held unequivocally). Ac-
cordingly the distinction between knowledge and belief is
somewhat blurred, and what is referred to as a ‘belief set’
might alternatively be called a ‘knowledge base’, as is often
the practice in AI systems.
2.2. Controller
A controller effectively determines the modeled agent’s pur-
pose or goals by managing the DRS’s interaction with its
environment and guiding the reasoning process. With re-
gard to the latter, the objectives typically include (i) deriving
all expressions salient to the given application and entering
these into the belief set, and (ii) ensuring that the belief set
remains consistent. To these ends, the business of the con-
troller amounts to performing the following operations.
1. Receiving input from its environment, e.g., human users,
sensors, or other artificial agents, expressing this input as
expressions in the given language L, and entering these
expressions into the belief set in the manner described
above (derivation path items (3) and (4)). During this op-
eration, new symbols are appropriated as needed to ex-
press concepts not already represented in the current Lt.
2. Applying inference rules in accordance with some ex-
tralogical objective (some plan, purpose, or goal) and en-
tering the derived conclusions into the belief set in the
manner described above (derivation path items (1) and
(2)).
3. Performing any actions that may be prescribed as a re-
sult of the above reasoning process, e.g., moving a robotic
arm, returning a response to a human user, or sending a
message to another artificial agent.
4. Whenever necessary, applying a ‘dialectical belief revi-
sion’ algorithm for contradiction resolution in the manner
described below.
A contradiction is an expression of the form P ∧ ¬P .
Sometimes it is convenient to represent the general notion of
contradiction by the falsum symbol, ⊥. Contradiction reso-
lution is triggered whenever a contradiction or a designated
equivalent expression is entered into the belief set. We may
assume that this only occurs as the result of an inference
rule application, since it obviously would make no sense to
enter a contradiction directly as an extralogical axiom. The
contradiction resolution algorithm entails three steps:
1. Starting with the from-list in the label on the contradic-
tory expression, backtrack through the belief set following
from-lists until one identifies all extralogical axioms that
were involved in the contradiction’s derivation. Note that
such extralogical axioms must exist, since, by the con-
sistency of the logic, the contradiction cannot constitute
analytical knowledge, and hence must be synthetic.
2. Change the belief status of one or more of these extralogi-
cal axioms, as many as necessary to invalidate the deriva-
tion of the given contradiction. The decision as to which
axioms to retract may be dictated, or at least guided by,
the epistemic entrenchment values. In effect, those ex-
pressions with the lower values would be preferred for
retraction. In some systems, this retraction process may
be automated, and in others it may be human assisted.
3. Forward chain through to-lists starting with the extralog-
ical axiom(s) just retracted, and retract all expressions
whose derivations were dependent on those axioms.
These retracted expressions should include the contradic-
tion that triggered this round of belief revision (otherwise
the correct extralogical axioms were not retracted).
This belief revision algorithm is reminiscent of G. W. F.
Hegel’s ‘dialectic’, described as a process of ‘negation of
the negation’ (Hegel 1931). In that treatment, the latter (first
occurring) negation is a perceived internal conflict (here a
contradiction), and the former (second occurring) one is an
act of transcendence aimed at resolving the conflict (here re-
moving the contradiction). In recognition of Hegel, the be-
lief revision/retraction process formalized in the above algo-
rithm will be called Dialectical Belief Revision.
3. First-Order Logic
The paper (Schwartz 2013) defines a notion of first-order
theory suitable for use in a DRS, provides this with a well-
defined semantics (a notion of model), and establishes a
Soundness Theorem: a theory is consistent if it has a model.
The notions of theory and semantics are designed to accom-
modate the notion of a belief set evolving over time, as well
as inference rules that act by instantiating axiom schemas.
A first-order language L is defined following the notations
of (Hamilton 1988). This includes notations Amn as pred-
icate symbols (here the n-th m-ary predicate symbol) and
an for individual variables. Then, in the path logic, the lan-
guages at each successive time step are sublanguages of L.
The semantics follows the style of (Shoenfield 1967). The
axiom schemas of (Hamilton 1988) are adopted. The infer-
ence rules are those of (Hamilton 1988) together with some
rules for axiom schema instantiation. The formalism is suf-
ficiently different from the classical version that new proofs
of all relevant propositions must be restated in this context
and proven correct. The treatment also establishes the valid-
ity of several derived inference rules that become useful in
later examples, including:
Hypothetical Syllogism From P → Q and Q → R
infer P → R, where P,Q,R are any formulas.
Aristotelian Syllogism From (∀x)(P → Q) and
P (a/x), infer Q(a/x), where P,Q are any formulas, x is
any individual variable, and a is any individual constant.
Subsumption From (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) and
(∀x)(β(x) → γ(x)), infer (∀x)(α(x) → γ(x)), where
α, β, γ are any unary predicate symbols, and x is any in-
dividual variable.
Contradiction Detection From P and ¬P infer ⊥,
where P is any formula.
Conflict Detection From (∀x)¬(P ∧Q), P (a/x), and
Q(a/x) infer ⊥, where P,Q are any formulas, x is any
individual variable, and a is any individual constant.
4. Example: Multiple Inheritance with
Exceptions
The main objective of (Schwartz 1997) was to show how a
DRS framework could be used to formulate reasoning about
property inheritance with exceptions, where the underlying
logic was a probabilistic ‘logic of qualified syllogisms’. This
work was inspired in part by the frame-based systems due to
(Minsky 1975) and constitutes an alternative formulation of
the underlying logic (e.g., as discussed by (Hayes 1980)).
What was missing in (Schwartz 1997) was the notion of
a controller. There a reasoning system was presented and
shown to provide intuitively plausible solutions to numerous
‘puzzles’ that had previously appeared in the literature on
nonmonotonic reasoning, e.g., Opus the Penguin (Touretsky
1984), Nixon Diamond (Touretsky et al. 1987), and Clyde
the Elephant (Touretsky et al. 1987). But there was noth-
ing to guide the reasoning processes—no means for provid-
ing a sense of purpose for the reasoning agent. The present
work fills this gap by adding a controller. Moreover, it deals
with a simpler system based on first-order logic and remands
further exploitation of the logic of qualified syllogisms to a
later work. The kind of DRS developed in this section will
be termed a multiple inheritance system (MIS).
For this application the language L discussed in Sec-
tion 3 is expanded by including some typed predicate sym-
bols, namely, some unary predicate symbolsA(k)1 ,A
(k)
2 , . . .
representing kinds of things (any objects), and some unary
predicate symbols A(p)1 ,A
(p)
2 , . . . representing properties
of things. The superscripts k and p are applied also
to generic denotations. Thus an expression of the form
(∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)(x)) represents the proposition that all
αs have property β. These new predicate symbols are used
here purely as syntactical items for purposes of defining an
extralogical ‘specificity principle’ and some associated ex-
tralogical graphical structures and algorithms. Semantically
they are treated exactly the same as other predicate symbols.
A multiple-inheritance hierarchy H will be a directed
graph consisting of a set of nodes together with a set of links
represented as ordered pairs of nodes. Nodes may be either
object nodes, kind nodes, or property nodes. A link of the
form (object node, kind node) will be an object-kind link,
one of the form (kind node, kind node) will be a subkind-
kind link, and one of the form (kind node, property node)
will be a has-property link. There will be no other types
of links. Object nodes will be labeled with (represent) in-
dividual constant symbols, kind nodes will be labeled with
(represent) kind-type unary predicate symbols, and property
nodes will be labeled with (represent) property-type unary
predicate symbols or negations of such symbols. In addi-
tion, each property type predicate symbol with bear a nu-
merical subscript, called an occurrence index, indicating an
occurrence of that symbol in a given hierarchy H . These
indexes are used to distinguish different occurrences of the
same property-type symbol in H . An object-kind link be-
tween an individual constant symbol a and a predicate sym-
bol α(k) will represent the formula α(k)(a), a subkind-kind
link between a predicate symbol α(k) and a predicate symbol
β(k) will represent the formula (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)),
and a has-property link between a predicate symbol α(k)
and a predicate symbol β(p)1 will represent the formula
(∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)1 (x)).
Given such an H , there is defined on the object nodes
and the kind nodes a specificity relation >s (read ‘more spe-
cific than’) according to: (i) if (node1,node2) is either an
object-kind link or a kind-kind link, then node1 >s node2,
and (ii) if node1 >s node2 and node2 >s node3, then
node1 >s node3. We shall also have a dual generality rela-
tion >g (read ‘more general than’) defined by node1 >g
node2 iff node2 >s node1. It follows that object nodes
are maximally specific and minimally general. It also fol-
lows that H may have any number of maximally general
nodes, and in fact that it need not be connected. A maxi-
mally general node is a root node. A path in a hierarchy H
(not to be confused with the path in a path logic) will be a
sequence node1, . . . ,noden wherein, node1 is a root node
and, for each i = 1, . . . , n − 2, the pair (nodei+1,nodei)
is a subkind-kind link, and, the pair (noden,noden−1) is
either a subkind-kind link or an object-kind link. Note that
property nodes do not participate in paths as here defined.
It is desired to organize a multiple inheritance hierarchy as
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) without redundant links with
respect to the object-kind and subkind-kind links (i.e., here
ignoring has-property links), where, as before, by a redun-
dant link is meant a direct link from some node to an ances-
tor of that node other than the node’s immediate ancestors
(i.e., other than its parents). More exactly, two distinct paths
will form a redundant pair if they have some node in com-
mon beyond the first place where they differ. This means that
they comprise two distinct paths to the common node(s). A
path will be simply redundant (or redundant in H) if it is a
member of a redundant pair. A path contains a loop if it has
more than one occurrence of the same node. Provisions are
made in the following algorithms to ensure that hierarchies
with loops or redundant paths are not allowed. As is custom-
ary, the hierarchies will be drawn with the upward direction
being from more specific to less (less general to more), so
that roots appear at the top and objects appear at the bot-
tom. Kind-property links will extend horizontally from their
associated kind nodes.
In terms of the above specificity relation on H , we can
assign an address to each object and kind node in the fol-
lowing manner. Let the addresses of the root nodes, in
any order, be (1), (2), (3), . . .. Then for the node with ad-
dress (1), say, let the next most specific nodes in any or-
der have the addresses (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), . . .; let the nodes
next most specific to the one with address (1, 1) have ad-
dresses (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3), . . .; and so on. Thus an
address indicates the node’s position in the hierarchy relative
to some root node. Inasmuch as an object or kind node may
be more specific than several different root nodes, the same
node may have more than one such address. Note that the
successive initial segments of an address are the addresses
of the nodes appearing in the path from the related root node
to the node having that initial segment as its address. Let >
denote the usual lexicographic order on addresses. We shall
apply > also to the nodes having those addresses. It is easily
verified that, if node1 > node2 and the node2 address is an
initial segment of the node1 address, then node1 >s node2,
and conversely. For object and kind nodes, we shall use the
term specificity rank (or just rank) synonymously with ‘ad-
dress’.
Since, as mentioned, it is possible for any given object or
kind node to have more than one address, it thus can have
more than one rank. Two nodes are comparable with respect
to the specificity relation >s, however, only if they appear
on the same path, i.e., only if one node is an ancestor of
the other, in which case only the rank each has acquired due
to its being on that path will apply. Thus, if two nodes are
comparable with respect to their ranks by the relation >s,
there is no ambiguity regarding the ranks being compared.
Having thus defined specificity ranks for object and kind
nodes, let us agree that each property node inherits the rank
of the kind node to which it is linked. Thus for property
nodes the rank is not an address.
OpusTweety
Bird(k) CanFly
(p)
1
¬CanFly(p)2Penguin(k)
Figure 3: Tweety the Bird and Opus the Penguin as an MIS.
An example of such a hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.
Here ‘Tweety’ and ‘Opus’ may be taken as names for the in-
dividual constants a1 and a2, and ‘Bird(k)’, ‘Penguin(k)’,
and ‘CanFly(p)’ can be taken as names, respectively, for the
unary predicate symbols A(k)1 , A
(k)
2 , and A
(p)
1 . [Note: The
superscripts are retained on the names only to visually iden-
tify the types of the predicate symbols, and could be dropped
without altering the meanings.] The links represent the for-
mulas
(∀x)(Penguin(k)(x)→ Bird(k)(x))
(∀x)(Bird(k)(x)→ CanFly(p)1 (x))
(∀x)(Penguin(k)(x)→ ¬CanFly(p)2 (x))
Bird(k)(Tweety)
Penquin(k)(Opus)
The subscripts 1 and 2 on the predicate symbol CanFly(p) in
the graph distinguish the different occurrences of this sym-
bol in the graph, and the same subcripts on the symbol oc-
currences in the formulas serve to correlate these with their
occurrences in the graph. Note that these are just separate oc-
currences of the same symbol, however, and therefore have
identical semantic interpretations. Formally, CanFly(p)1 and
CanFly
(p)
2 can be taken as standing for A
(p)
11
and A(p)12 with
the lower subscripts being regarded as extralogical notations
indicating different occurrences of A(p)1 .
This figure reveals the rationale for the present notion of
multiple-inheritance hierarchy. The intended interpretation
of the graph is that element nodes and kind nodes inherit
the properties of their parents, with the exception that more
specific property nodes take priority and block inheritances
from those that are less specific. Let us refer to this as the
specificity principle. In accordance with this principle, in
Figure 3 Tweety inherits the property CanFly from Bird, but
Opus does not inherit this property because the inheritance
is blocked by the more specific information that Opus is a
Penguin and Penguins cannot fly.
Bird
Penguin
Flier
Tweety Opus
Is−a
Is−a
Is−a
Is−a
Is−not−a
Figure 4: Tweety the Bird and Opus the Penguin, original
version.
Figure 3 constitutes a rethinking of the well-known ex-
ample of Opus the penguin depicted in Figure 4 (adapted
from (Touretsky1984)). The latter is problematic in that, by
one reasoning path one can conclude that Opus is a flier,
and by another reasoning path that he is not. This same
contradiction is implicit in the formulas introduced above,
since if one were to apply the axioms and rules of first-
order logic discussed in Section 3, one could derive both
CanFly(p)(Opus) and ¬CanFly(p)(Opus), in which case
the system would be inconsistent.
Formal Specification of an Arbitrary MIS
We are now in a position to define the desired kind of DRS.
For the path logic, let the language be the one described
above, obtained from the L of Section 3 by adjoining the
additional unary kind-type and property-type predicate sym-
bols, let the axiom schemas and inference rules be those dis-
cussed in Section 3 together with Aristotelian Syllogism and
Contradiction Detection. In this case, derivation paths will
consist of triples (Lt, Bt, Ht), where these components re-
spectively are the (sub)language (of L), belief set, and mul-
tiple inheritance hierarchy at time t. In accordance with Sec-
tion 2, let L0 be the minimal sublanguage of L consisting of
all formulas that can be built up from the atomic formula ⊥,
and let B0 = ∅. In addition, let H0 = ∅.
The MIS controller is designed to enforce the above speci-
ficity principle. Contradictions can arise in an MIS that has
inherently contradictory root nodes in its multiple inheri-
tance hierarchy. An example of this, the famous Nixon Di-
amond (Touretsky 1987), will be discussed. The purpose
of the MIS controller will be (i) to derive and enter into
the belief set all object classifications implicit in the mul-
tiple inheritance hierarchy, i.e., all formulas of the form
α(k)(a) that can be derived from formulas describing the
hierarchy (while observing the specificity principle), and
(ii) to ensure that the belief set remains consistent. Item
(i) thus defines what will be considered the salient infor-
mation for an MIS. Also, the MIS controller is intended to
maintain the multiple inheritance hierarchy as a DAG with-
out redundant paths with respect to just the object and kind
nodes. Formulas that can be input by the users may have
one of the forms (i) α(k)(a), (ii) (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(k)(x)),
(iii) (∀x)(α(k)(x) → β(p)(x)), and (iv) (∀x)(α(k)(x) →
¬β(p)(x)). It will be agreed that the epistemic entrenchment
value for all input formulas is 0.5.
We may now define some algorithms that are to be exe-
cuted in response to each type of user input. There will be
eight types of events. Event Types 1, 6, 7 and 8 correspond
to user inputs, and the others occur as the result of rule appli-
cations. In all such events it is assumed that, if the formula
provided to the controller already exists and is active in the
current belief set, its input is immediately rejected. In each
event, assume that the most recent entry into the derivation
path is (Lt, Bt, Ht). For the details of the algorithms, please
see (Schwartz 2013).
Event Type 1: A formula of the form α(k)(a) is provided
to the controller by a human user.
Event Type 2: A formula of the form α(k)(a) is provided
to the controller as a result of an inference rule application
(Aristotelian Syllogism).
Event Type 3: A formula of the form α(p)(a) is provided
to the controller as a result of an inference rule application
(Aristotelian Syllogism).
Event Type 4: A formula of the form ¬α(p)(a) is pro-
vided to the controller as a result of an inference rule appli-
cation (Aristotelian Syllogism).
Event Type 5: The formula⊥ is provided to the controller
as the result of an application of Contradiction Detection.
Event Type 6: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) →
β(k)(x)) is provided to the controller by a human user.
Event Type 7: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) →
β(p)(x)) is provided to the controller by a human user.
Event Type 8: A formula of the form (∀x)(α(k)(x) →
¬β(p)(x)) is provided to the controller by a human user.
Main Results
That an MIS controller produces all relevant salient infor-
mation as prescribed above can be summarized as a pair of
theorems.
Theorem 5.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain
the hierarchy with respect to the object and kind nodes as a
directed acyclic graph without redundant links.
Theorem 5.2. After any process initiated by a user input
terminates, the resulting belief set will contain a formula of
the form α(k)(a) or α(p)(a) or ¬α(p)(a) iff the formula is
derivable from the formulas corresponding to links in the
inheritance hierarchy, observing the specificity principle.
That the algorithms serve to preserve the consistency of
the belief set is established as:
Theorem 5.3. For any derivation path in an MIS, the be-
lief set that results at the conclusion of a process initiated by
a user input will be consistent with respect to the formulas of
the forms α(k)(a), (∀x)(α(k)(x)→ β(p)(x)), and α(p)(a).
Illustration 1
Some of the algorithms associated with the foregoing events
can be illustrated by considering the inputs needed to create
the inheritance hierarchy shown in Figure 3. This focuses
on the process of property inheritance with exceptions. Let
us abbreviate ‘Bird’, ‘Penguin’, and ‘CanFly’, respectively,
by ‘B’, ‘P’, and ‘CF’. In accordance with the definition of
derivation path in Section 2.1, the language L0 will con-
sist only of the formula ⊥, and the belief set B0 = ∅. In
accordance with the definition of an MIS, H0 = ∅. We con-
sider inputs of the afoermentioned formulas, with each input
comprising a type of event initiating a particular reasoning
algorithm. These inputs and event types are:
(∀x)(P(k)(x)→ B(k)(x)), Type 6
(∀x)(B(k)(x)→ CF(p)1 (x)), Type 7
(∀x)(P(k)(x)→ ¬CF(p)2 (x)), Type 8
B(k)(Tweety), Type 1
P(k)(Opus), Type 1
The specificity principle is invoked during the last event.
This results in the following belief set (omitting formula la-
bels):
(∀x)(P(k)(x)→ B(k)(x))
(∀x)(B(k)(x)→ CF(p)1 (x))
(∀x)(P(k)(x)→ ¬CF(p)2 (x))
B(k)(Tweety)
CF
(p)
1 (Tweety)
P(k)(Opus)
B(k)(Opus)
¬CF(p)2 (Opus)
Thus is is seen that, in this example, the algorithms serve
to derive all salient information, i.e., all formulas of the
forms α(k)(a), α(p)(a), and α(p)(a) that are implicit in the
graph, while at the same time correctly enforcing the speci-
ficity principle. It may also be observed that the belief set is
consistent.
Illustration 2
This considers an application of Contradiction Detection.
The classic Nixon Diamond puzzle (cf. Touretsky et al.
1987) is shown in Figure 5. Here a contradiction arises be-
cause, by the reasoning portrayed on the left side, Nixon is
a pacifist, whereas, by the reasoning portrayed on the right,
he is not. The resolution of this puzzle in the context of an
MIS can be described in terms of the multiple inheritance
hierarchy shown in Figure 6.
Nixon
Pacifist
Quaker Republican
Is−a Is−a
Is−a Is−not−a
Figure 5: Nixon Diamond, original version.
Nixon
Quaker(k) Republican(k) ¬Pacifist(p)2Pacifist(p)1
Figure 6: Nixon Diamond as an MIS.
The links in Figure 6 represent the formulas
(∀x)(Quaker(k)(x)→ Pacifist(p)1 (x))
(∀x)(Republican(k)(x)→ ¬Pacifist(p)2 (x))
Quaker(k)(Nixon)
Republican(k)(Nixon)
The action of the algorithms may be traced similarly as
in Illustration 1. Let ‘Quaker’, ‘Republican’ and ‘Pacifist’
denote the predicate symbols A(k)1 , A
(k)
2 and A
(p)
1 , and ab-
breviate these by ‘Q’, ‘R’ and ‘P’. Let ‘Nixon’ denote the
individual constant a1. L0, B0, and H0 will be as before.
The inputs and their event types are:
(∀x)(Q(k)(x)→ P(p)1 (x)), Type 7.
(∀x)(R(k)(x)→ ¬P(p)1 (x)), Type 8.
Q(k)(Nixon), Type 1.
R(k)(Nixon), Type 1.
These lead to the following belief set (again omitting for-
mual labels):
(∀x)(Q(k)(x)→ P(p)1 (x))
(∀x)(R(k)(x)→ ¬P(p)2 (x))
Q(k)(Nixon).
P
(p)
1 (Nixon)
R(k)(Nixon
¬P(p)2 (Nixon)⊥
At this point Dialectical Belief Revision is invoked. All
the formulas that were input by the user are candidates for
belief change. Suppose that the formula (∀x)(R(k)(x) →
¬P(p)2 (x)), is chosen. Then the procedure forward chains
through to lists, starting with this formula, and changes to
disbel the status first of ¬P(p)2 (Nixon), and then of ⊥. This
results in a belief set with these three formulas removed (dis-
believed) leaving only the left side of the hierarchy in Fig-
ure 6. Thus again all salient information is derived and the
resulting belief set is consistent.
Further well-known puzzles that can be resolved similarly
within an MIS are the others discussed in (Schwartz 1997),
namely, Bosco the Blue Whale (Stein 1992), Suzie the Platy-
pus (Stein 1992), Clyde the Royal Elephant (Touretsky et
al. 1987), and Expanded Nixon Diamond (Touretsky et al.
1987).
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